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I. INTRODUCTION
When the Supreme Court rules on a gun case, it instantly makes
headlines. Such was the case on June 28, 2010, when the Court handed
down its decision in the hotly contested, widely publicized McDonald v.
City of Chicago. The typical headlines accompanying the Court's deci-
sion, that the "Justices Extend[ed] Firearm Rights"' in a close ruling are
overly simplistic. 2 In reality, McDonald stood for much more.3
With the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, numerous pro-
visions in the Bill of Rights were also held applicable against state and
local governments.' In the seminal 1973 case, Roe v. Wade,' for exam-
ple, the Court held that a woman's right to have an abortion applies not
only in regard to the federal government, but also in regard to state and
local governments.6 Until recently, however, not all of the rights enu-
merated in the Bill of Rights have been applied against the states.7 One
significant exception was the Second Amendment. "For years, the Sec-
ond Amendment has been the forgotten and neglected stepchild of the
Bill of Rights," until the Supreme Court declared that, "just like every
other right detailed in the Bill of Rights, the Second Amendment
referred to individuals, not the military."' In the past, courts held that
the state and local governments could regulate guns in ways that the
federal government could not.' In 2010, however, for the first time, the
Court held that the Second Amendment was applicable against the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment.
The McDonald decision has been met with both favor and criti-
cism.'o Critics argue that, while the majority made clear that the City of
Chicago's handgun ban was unconstitutional and that there is such a
1. Adam Liptak, Justices Extend Firearms Rights in 5-to-4 Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, June 28,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/29/us/29scotus.html.
2. See Ryan Witt, A full summary and analysis of the McDonald v. Chicago Supreme Court
Case, EXAMINER.COM, June 28, 2010, http://www.examiner.com/political-buzz-in-national/a-full-
summary-and-analysis-of-the-mcdonald-v-chicago-supreme-court-case.
3. The Court's holding in McDonald arguably raised more questions than it answered. In his
dissent, Justice Breyer catalogued a number of these questions: Does the right to possess weapons
for self-defense extend outside the home? What kinds of guns are necessary for self-defense? Who
can possess a gun and what kind? Does the presence of a child in the house matter? Does the
presence of a convicted felon in the house matter? At what point do registration requirements
become unconstitutional?
4. See Witt, supra note 2.
5. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6. Id.
7. Witt, supra note 2.
8. Kevin Ecker, Heller Part II: McDonald v. Chicago, TRUE NORTH, Mar. 2, 2010, http://
looktruenorth.comliberty/right-to-keep-and-bear-arms/ 1498-heller-part-ii-mcdonald-vs-
chicago.html.
9. Witt, supra note 2.
10. See Press Release, Nat'l Rifle Ass'n. Instit. for Legislative Action, Regarding U.S.
198 [Vol. 66:197
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thing as a reasonable regulation of firearms, the Court failed to address
which types of regulations are reasonable and which are unreasonable.'"
"States and localities with various gun control measures are now left to
wonder whether their laws will meet the Supreme Court's definition of
reasonable."1 2 Opponents also argue that such incorporation inevitably
opened the floodgates to litigation and that the Court erred in failing to
clarify the standard of review." "If this Court holds that the Second
Amendment is incorporated, state and federal courts undoubtedly will be
further inundated with challenges to gun laws."l 4 Without the Court's
guidance on the standard of review, these challenges may lead to incon-
sistent outcomes and uncertainty in the legal system.
This note argues that the Court inappropriately based its opinion in
McDonald on a selective reading of history and District of Columbia v.
Heller," which was almost entirely centered on a similar historical anal-
ysis. The High Court has thus resolved its Second Amendment jurispru-
dence to be defined by forcing square pegs into round holes, allowing
federalism to yield to parochialism. This note maintains that the Court's
opinion in McDonald is flawed because it fails to give state and local
governments guidance by not addressing the level of scrutiny required
for the Second Amendment. This note agrees with critics who contend
that the Court's decision could potentially invalidate gun regulations
throughout the country, precipitating a deluge for litigation.
Part II discusses District of Columbia v. Heller, the predecessor
case to McDonald. Part III presents the factual and procedural back-
ground of McDonald v. City of Chicago. Part IV details Justice Alito's
majority opinion, the dissenting opinions by Justices Stevens and
Breyer, and the concurring opinions by Justices Scalia and Thomas in
McDonald. Part V presents legal and policy arguments supporting the
assertion that McDonald was wrongly decided. Part VI addresses the
Court's critical error in failing to articulate a standard of review for the
Second Amendment while discussing a recent Ninth Circuit's decision
addressing the issue. Finally, Part VII concludes the note with a brief
discussion of the potential future ramifications of McDonald.
Supreme Court Decision McDonald v. City of Chicago, June 28, 2010, http://www.nraila.org/
News/Read/NewsReleases.aspx?ID= 13956.
11. Witt, supra note 2.
12. Id.
13. Brief for Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Neither Party at 3, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521).
14. Sayre Weaver, Supreme Court's Second Amendment Decision in McDonald v. Chicago
Likely to Spawn Challenges to Local Firearns Laws, THE PUBuc LAW JOURNAL, Vol. 33, No. 3,
Summer 2010; see also Libby Lewis, NRA Eyes More Targets After D.C. Gun Ban Win, NAT'L
PUBLic RADIO, June 29, 2008, http://www.npr.org/templates/text/s.php?sld=92008363&m=1.
15. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
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II. DisTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. HELLER: THE PREDECESSOR
TO McDONALD
A. Factual and Procedural Background
The District of Columbia City Counsel enacted three gun codes,' 6
entirely banning the possession of handguns within D.C. Under the ban,
D.C. residents were allowed to keep rifles and shotguns in their homes,
but such guns were to be disassembled or bound by a trigger lock."
In 2003, the Heller Plaintiffs filed suit against the District of
Columbia, alleging that the D.C. gun codes violated their Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms." Heller, a D.C. police officer,
was allowed to carry a handgun while on duty at the Federal Justice
Center, and wished to keep a handgun at his home as well.19 However,
his request to keep a handgun in his home was denied on the basis of the
District's gun laws.20
The district court denied Heller's motion for summary judgment as
being moot, holding that "[b]ecause [the] court rejects the notion that
there is an individual right to bear arms separate and apart from service
in the militia and because none of the plaintiffs have asserted member-
ship in the militia, plaintiffs have no viable claim under the Second
Amendment of the United States Constitution."21
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's
decision and ordered the lower court to grant Heller's motion for sum-
mary judgment.22 The appellate court relied on its decision in Seegars v.
Gonzales23 to conclude that, in order to have standing to challenge the
gun ban, the law must have caused plaintiffs to suffer an actual injury.24
Though the court found that five of the plaintiffs had in fact not been
injured as a result of the law, and thus lacked the requisite standing to
bring suit, the court also held that, because Dick Heller applied for and
was denied a gun permit, he had been injured as a result of the law. 2 5
Because the other plaintiffs lacked standing, the court dismissed them
from the case, leaving Heller as the sole plaintiff.26
16. See District of Columbia, Municipal Codes §§ 7-2502.02; 7-2507.02; 22-4504.
17. Id.
18. Parker v. District of Columbia, 311 F. Supp. 2d 103 (D.D.C. 2004), judgment reversed
and remanded, 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
19. Heller, 554 U.S. at 570.
20. Id.
21. Parker, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 109.
22. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted and aff'd,
554 U.S. 570 (2008).
23. 396 F.3d 1248 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
24. Parker, 478 F.3d at 374-75.
25. Id. at 375-76.
26. Id.
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SHOOTING BLANKS
Next, the court of appeals addressed whether the right to bear arms
applies only to organized militias or also to individuals in a non-organ-
ized militia.27 The court held that there was an individual right to bear
arms and that, "[t]he important point ... is that the popular nature of the
militia is consistent with an individual right to keep and bear arms: Pre-
serving an individual right was the best way to ensure that the militia
could serve when called."28
Finally, the appellate court referred to the Supreme Court's discus-
sion of the terms "arms" in United States v. Miller29 to further support
the assertion that the D.C. gun ban was unconstitutional because the
"modem handgun and . . . the rifle and long-barrel shot-gun [are]
lineal descendant[s] of that founding-era weapon."30
In September, 2007, petitioners, the District of Columbia and
Mayor Adrian Fenty, filed a petition for writ of certiorari.3 ' The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to address "[w]hether the following
provisions, D.C. Code §§ 7-2502.02(a)(4), 22-4504(a), and 7-2507.02,
violate the Second Amendment rights of individuals who are not affili-
ated with any state-regulated militia, but who wish to keep handguns and
other firearms for private use in their homes."32
B. Majority Opinion: No Militia Needed-The Second Amendment
Guarantees an Individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms
For the first time since Miller,33 the Supreme Court heard oral argu-
ments and ruled on a Second Amendment case.34 The Court decided the
case in a closely divided 5-4 opinion. Justice Scalia delivered the opin-
ion of the Court and was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. 3 5 Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opin-
ion and was joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.3 6 Justice
Breyer also filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Stevens, Souter
and Ginsburg joined.37
The Court held that the Second Amendment protects an individ-
27. Id. at 386.
28. Id. at 389.
29. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
30. Parker, 478 F.3d at 398-401.
31. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No.
07-290).
32. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
33. Miller, 307 U.S. at 174.
34. Adam Freedman, Clause and Effect, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2007, http://www.nytimes.
com/2007/12/16/opinion/16freedman.html?r-1.
35. Heller, 554 U.S. at 572-73.
36. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
37. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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ual's right to keep and bear firearms, even those not kept in connection
with an "organized militia."" The Court stated that such firearms could
be used for legal purposes, which include self-defense in the home. 9
The Court, reaching its opinion that by surmising the intention of the
founders during the Amendment's drafting, reasoned that, because New
Hampshire's Second Amendment drafting proposal, Pennsylvania's
minority proposal, and Samuel Adams' Massachusetts proposal
"unequivocally referred to individual rights," the Second Amendment,
as contemplated by the Constitution's drafters, applies to individuals in
non-organized militia.4 0 The Court found further support for its conclu-
sion based on the work of Second Amendment scholars St. George
Tucker, William Rawle, and Joseph Story, as well as pre-Civil War case
law, post-Civil War legislation, and post-Civil war commentators. 4 1 The
majority preemptively defended its conclusion that the Second Amend-
ment extends to individuals by finding that neither United States v.
Cruikshank42 nor Presser v. Illinois" contradicted it." In fact, the Court
claimed that Cruikshank's limited discussion of the Second Amendment
actually supported its conclusion that the Second Amendment extended
to individuals in non-military settings.4 5 Contrary to Justice Stevens'
interpretation of United States v. Miller,4 6 the Heller majority read
Miller as only a limit to the type of weapon and individual may keep, not
the right to keep and bear arms itself.47
Toward the end of the opinion, the Court explicitly stated that an
individual's Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms can be, and
is, limited.48 "Courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to
keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and
for whatever purpose . . . [and] the sorts of weapons protected were
those in common-use at the time."4 9 However, without specifying what
those common use weapons were, lower courts were left with more
questions than answers.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 570.
40. Id. at 571.
41. Id. at 605-19.
42. 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
43. 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
44. Heller, 554 U.S. at 618-20.
45. Id. at 619-20.
46. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
47. Heller, 554 U.S. at 621-26.
48. Id. at 625.




1. STEVENS: HELLER IS A "DRAMATIC UPHEAVAL IN THE LAW"
The crux of Justice Stevens' dissent is that the Second Amendment
was designed to protect an individual's right to keep and bear arms only
as part of a well-regulated militia."o Justice Stevens relied on the Court's
interpretation of the Second Amendment in Miller, stating that
the view of the Amendment we took in Miller-that it protects the
right to keep and bear arms for certain military purposes, but that it
does not curtail the Legislature's power to regulate the nonmilitary
use and ownership of weapons-is both the most natural reading of
the Amendment's text and the interpretation most faithful to the his-
tory of its adoption."
Justice Stevens found that "no new evidence has surfaced since 1980
supporting the view that the Amendment was intended to curtail the
power of Congress to regulate civilian use or misuse of weapons."5 2 The
absence of new evidence, coupled with the fact that the Court itself
endorsed the Miller interpretation of the Second Amendment in Lewis v.
United States,53 led Justice Stevens to conclude that the majority's bla-
tant failure to follow accepted precedent is a "dramatic upheaval in the
law."5 4 The Court, Stevens continued, "stakes its holding on a strained
and unpersuasive reading of the Amendment's text . . . and, ultimately
[makes] a feeble attempt to distinguish Miller that places more emphasis
on the Court's decisions process than on the reasoning in the opinion
itself."5
Justice Stevens next analyzed the majority's textual argument.5 6 He
pointed out that while the majority insisted that the words "the people"
in the Second Amendment must have the same meaning as they do in
the First and Fourth Amendment, "the Court itself reads the Second
Amendment to protect a 'subset' significantly narrower than the class of
persons protected by the First and Fourth Amendment.. . . [T]he Court
limits the protected class to 'law-abiding, responsible citizens,'"
whereas "the people" protected by the First and Fourth Amendments is
not limited in such a way.57 Further, Justice Stevens argued that the
Court's interpretation of the term "to keep and bear arms" is flawed:"
50. Id. at 636 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 637.
53. 445 U.S. 55 (1980).
54. Heller, 554 U.S. at 637-41(Stevens, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 686.
56. Id. at 644.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 646.
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"Had the framers wished to expand the meaning of the phrase 'bear
arms' to encompass civilian possession and use" Stevens explained,
"they could have done so by the addition of phrases such as 'for the
defense of themselves,' as was done in the Pennsylvania and Vermont
Declarations of Rights."5 9 Stevens maintained that the Court provided a
"short shrift" to the history of the drafting of the Second Amendment
and "dwelled" on four other sources that "shed only indirect light" on
the question the Court was addressing.6 0
2. BREYER: FIREARMS SHOULD BE REGULATED BY THE STATES
Justice Breyer provided two main reasons for his conclusion that
the majority's opinion was wrong. 6' Agreeing with Justice Stevens, Jus-
tice Breyer first reasoned that the Second Amendment protects militia-
related, and not individual self-defense related interests. 6 2 He then rea-
soned that the Second Amendment's protection is not absolute, and that
the government can regulate the interests served by the amendment.6 3
Because Justice Breyer joined Justice Stevens' dissent, the majority of
his dissent focused on proving his second point; that "the District's law
falls within the zone that the Second Amendment leaves open to regula-
tion by legislatures." 64
Justice Breyer began his dissent by providing examples of histori-
cal gun regulations that "citizens would then have thought compatible
with the 'right to keep and bear arms.' "65 He cited Boston, Philadelphia,
and New York City as examples of three American cities that restricted
the use of guns and regulated the storage of gunpowder, "a necessary
component of an operational firearm," to some degree.66
Justice Breyer then addressed how courts should determine whether
a firearm regulation is constitutional. He began by asserting that the
majority was wrong when it said that D.C.'s gun ban was unconstitu-
tional "[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to
enumerated constitutional rights."6 7 Justice Breyer claimed that the D.C.
ban would be constitutional if the rational-basis standard were applied,
as the gun law in question "seeks to prevent gun-related accidents, [and]
59. Id. at 645-46.
60. These four sources were the Seventeenth-century English Bill of Rights; Blackstone's
Commentaries on the Laws of England; postenactment commentary on the Second Amendment;
and post-Civil War legislative history.
61. Heller, 554 U.S. at 680 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 682.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 687.
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at least bears a 'rational relationship' to that 'legitimate' life-saving
objection."" Justice Breyer agreed with the majority's view that adopt-
ing a strict-scrutiny standard for gun regulations would be impossible
because "almost every gun-control regulation will seek to advance a
'primary safety concern of every government-a concern for the safety
and indeed the lives of its citizens."' 69 Justice Breyer continued by find-
ing that, "any attempt in theory to apply strict scrutiny to gun regulations
will in practice turn into an interest-balancing inquiry, with the interests
protected by the Second Amendment on one side and the governmental
public-safety concerns on the other."o Justice Breyer advocated for the
adoption of "such an interest-balancing inquiry explicitly."" He argued
that, because of the importance of the interests that lie on both sides of
the balancing equation, gun regulation should not be an area where
either constitutionality or unconstitutionality should be presumed.7 2 Fur-
ther, he stated that Courts normally defer "to a legislature's empirical
judgment in matters where a legislature is likely to have greater exper-
tise and greater institutional fact-finding capacity."7 3
Justice Breyer next analyzed the specific D.C. firearm restrictions
in question.7 4 In particular, he focused on the third restriction, which, in
most cases, prohibited the registration of a handgun within the District."
He analyzed whether this restriction violated the Second Amendment by
assessing "how the statute seeks to further the governmental interests
that it serves, how the statute burdens the interests that the Second
Amendment seeks to protect, and whether there are practical less bur-
densome ways of furthering those interests."7 6 Justice Breyer concluded
that, because the District's legislatures anticipated judgments that were
based on "substantial evidence," the "statute properly seeks to further
the sort of life-preserving and public-safety interests that the Court has
called 'compelling.""' Based on the generally accepted belief that the
principal purpose of the Second Amendment is "the preservation of a
well-regulated militia,"78 and that there is no "evidence tending to show
that possession or use of a 'shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen
inches in length' . . . has some reasonable relationship to the preserva-
68. Id.
69. Id. (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987)).




74. Id. at 692.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 698-705.
78. Id.
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tion or efficiency of a well regulated militia," Justice Breyer concluded
that the D.C. gun ban only minimally, if at all, burdens the primary
objective of the amendment.79 Because the "ban's very objective is to
significantly reduce the number of handguns in the District," he rea-
soned that there were no superior, less restrictive alternatives to the ban.
III. McDONALD V. CITY OF CHICAGo: FACTUAL AND
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
The Petitioners were Chicago residents Otis McDonald, Adam
Orlov, Colleen Lawson, and David Lawson.so These Chicagoans wanted
to keep handguns in their homes for self-defense, but were unable to do
so because of Chicago's law prohibiting ownership of such firearms."
For example, one Chicago ordinance stated, "no person shall . . . possess
... any firearm unless such person is the holder of a valid registration
certificate for such firearm."82 The subsequent section of that code for-
bade the registration of most handguns, resulting in an effective ban on
handguns.83 The City of Oak Park, Illinois enacted similar ordinances
prohibiting personal possession of "any firearm [including] pistols,
revolvers, guns and small arms .... *"84 The Chicago petitioners wanted
to keep guns in their homes for self-defense, as many of them had previ-
ously been the targets of violence." For example, Colleen Lawson's
home had been burglarized on several occasions.8 6 Otis McDonald, a
community activist, lived in a high-crime neighborhood where danger-
ous drug dealers threatened his life."
Following the Court's 2008 decision in Heller," the petitioners,
along with the Illinois State Rifle Association and the Second Amend-
ment Foundation, Inc., filed suit in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois." They challenged Chicago's handgun
79. Id. at 705-07.
80. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010).
8 1. Id.
82. Id. (citing CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 8-20-040(a) (2009)).
83. Id. (citing CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 8-20-050(c) (2009)).
84. Id. (citing OAK PARK, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § § 27-2-1 (2007), 27-1-1 (2009)).
85. Id. at 3026.
86. Id. at 3027.
87. Id.
88. See NRA, Inc. v. Village of Oak Park, 617 F. Supp.2d 752 (N.D. Ill. 2008). Counsel for
the plaintiffs in McDonald filed suit on the same morning that Heller was to be decided. The
National Rifle Association filed two suits the day after Heller was decided. Attorneys for the
plaintiffs in all three suits filed under the presumption that the Court would rule the way it did in
Heller.
89. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3027.
206 [Vol. 66:197
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ban, claiming it violated the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. 90 The
National Rifle Association and two Oak Park residents filed a similar
action in the same district, challenging Oak Park's handgun ban.91 The
National Rifle Association filed an action challenging the Chicago ordi-
nances, as well. 92
B. Procedural Background
The three cases were assigned to District Judge Milton I. Shadur.13
Rejecting the plaintiffs' arguments that the City of Chicago and Oak
Park's gun bans were unconstitutional, the district court held that the
Second Amendment was not incorporated to the States through the Four-
teenth Amendment.94 The district court relied on the Seventh Circuit's
decision in Quilici v. Morton Grove, where the Seventh Circuit upheld
the constitutionality of a handgun ban. 96 Judge Shadur further reasoned
that because "Heller . . . explicitly refrained from opining on the subject
of incorporation ven non of the Second Amendment,"9 7 and "a district
judge has a duty to follow established precedent in the Court of Appeals
to which he or she is beholden . . . ,"9 Chicago's and Oak Park's gun
bans were constitutional.
The petitioners in the related cases separately appealed the district
court's decision, and the Seventh Circuit consolidated the cases.99 The
Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that the gun bans in
question were constitutional." The Seventh Circuit relied on United
States v. Cruikshank,1' Presser v. Illinois,1 0 2 and Miller v. Texas.10 3
Cruickshank, Presser and Miller were decided following the Seventh
Circuit's analysis of the Privileges or Immunities Clause'0 in the




93. NRA, Inc. v. Village of Oak Park, 617 F. Supp. 2d 752 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
94. Id.
95. 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982).
96. Id. at 271.
97. Oak Park, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 754.
98. Id. at 753.
99. Brief for Respondents the National Rifle Association of America, Inc. et al. in Support of
Petitioners at ii, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521).
100. NRA, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 567 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 2009).
101. 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
102. 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
103. 153 U.S. 535 (1894).
104. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3027.
105. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873). The Supreme Court upheld a Louisiana law
requiring butchering of all animals in New Orleans to be done by a single private corporation.
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of those cases as 'defunct' and recognized that they did not consider the
question whether the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
incorporates the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms."o106
The Seventh Circuit, however, declined to forecast how the Second
Amendment would hold up under the Court's modem selective-incorpo-
ration approach and pointed out its unambiguous responsibility to follow
Supreme Court precedents that have direct applications.10 7 Therefore,
the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that the gun laws
were constitutional. 08
Although the cases were consolidated by the Seventh Circuit,
because of their slight differences in scope, the parties (McDonald and
the National Rifle Association) appealed separately to the Supreme
Court.109 The Supreme Court granted certiorari"10 to address
[w]hether the right of the people to keep and bear arms is guaranteed
by the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution is incor-
porated into the Due Process Clause or the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment so as to be applicable to the
States, thereby invalidating ordinances prohibiting possession of
handguns in the home."
The Court heard oral arguments and issued its 5-4 decision on June 28,
2010.112
IV. McDONALD V. CITY OF CHICAGO: THE SECOND AMENDMENT
APPLIED TO THE STATES
A. Majority and Plurality Opinions: The Second Amendment Is
Incorporated to the States Through the
Fourteenth Amendment
Justice Alito began the McDonald analysis with a discussion of the
historical relationship between the Bill of Rights and the States.' The
Court provided a summary of the 1873 landmark decision in the Slaugh-
Justice Miller held that the law was a valid public health measure, essentially erasing the
Privileges or Immunities Clause.
106. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3027 (citing NRA, Inc. v. Chicago, 567 F.3d 856, 857-858 (7th
Cir. 2009)).
107. Id.
108. NRA v. City of Chicago, 567 F.3d 856, 860 (7th Cir. 2009).
109. See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (No. 08-1521).
110. David Savage & Kristin Schorsch, Supreme Court to Hear Challenge to Chicago Gun
Law, CHICAGO BREAKING NEWS, Sept. 30, 2009, http://www.chicagobreakingnews.com/2009/09/
supreme-court-may-decide-on-hearing-chicago-gun-cases.html.
111. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 114.
112. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
113. Id. at 3028.
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ter-House Cases.'14 Justice Miller's opinion for the Slaughter-House
Court concluded, "[t]he Privileges or Immunities Clause protects only
those rights which owe their existence to the Federal government, its
National Character, its Constitution or its laws."' 15 Despite extensive
disagreement about the correctness of the Slaughter-House Cases,"'6 the
McDonald plurality declined to reconsider whether that case was cor-
rect.117 The plurality rejected the argument that the Second Amendment
should be incorporated against the States through the Privileges or
Immunities Clause.II "For many decades, the question of the rights pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment against state infringement has been
analyzed under the Due Process Clause of that Amendment and not
under the Privileges or Immunities Clause."" 9 Therefore, the plurality
agreed only to consider whether the Second Amendment was incorpo-
rated to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.12 0 In order to justify its consideration of the Due Process
Clause, the Court stated that its decisions in Cruikshank,12 ' Presser, 22
and Miller'2 did not prevent it from considering the question. 124 "Cruik-
shank, Presser and Miller all preceded the era in which the Court began
the process of 'selective incorporation' under the Due Process Clause,
and we have never previously addressed the question of whether the
right to keep and bear arms applies to the States under that theory."' 25
The Court then provided a historical framework on the theory of
selective incorporation,126 giving examples of cases where the Court
overruled earlier decisions that held that the Bill of Rights did not apply
to the States.127 Justice Alito proclaimed that, in order to answer the
114. See Lawrence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form
Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARv. L. REV. 1221, 1297 n.247 (1995); see also
Akhil Reed Amar, Substance and Method in the Year 2000, 28 PEPP. L. REv. 601, 631 n.178
(2001).
115. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3028 (quoting Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 79 (1873)).
116. Id. at 3029.
117. Id.
118. As exemplified by Justice Thomas's concurrence in this case and his dissent in Saenz v.
Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999), Thomas alone opined that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects
certain rights.
119. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3029.
120. Id. at 3031.
121. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
122. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
123. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
124. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3031.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 3034-36.
127. For example, the Court cited Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), overruling Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), overruling Betts v.
Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
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question of whether the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms
is incorporated to the States through the Due Process Clause, it was criti-
cal to "decide whether the right to keep and bear arms is fundamental to
our scheme of ordered liberty ... [or whether] this right is deeply rooted
in this Nation's history and tradition."l 28 The Court reasoned that,
because the right to keep and bear arms is "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition," the Second Amendment is incorporated
to the States through the Due Process Clause. 12 9 The Court relied prima-
rily on its decision in Heller:
Self-defense is a basic right, recognized by many legal systems from
ancient times to the present day . .. [e]xplaining that the need for
defense of self, family, and property is most acute in the home . .. we
found that this right applies to handguns because they are the most
preferred firearm in the nation to keep and use for protection of one's
home and family.130
In further support of its conclusion, the McDonald majority referred to
the same selective readings of Seventeenth, Eighteenth, and Nineteenth-
century history that it relied on in Heller. For example, the Court refer-
enced Blackstone for the proposition that "the right to keep and bear
arms was one of the fundamental rights of Englishmen,"l 3 ' and that
American colonists agreed with this assessment.132 Likewise, the Court
reiterated its assertion from Heller that the Second Amendment right to
keep and bear arms was fundamental to the ratifiers of the Bill of Rights.
"During the 1788 ratification debates, the fear that the federal govern-
ment would disarm the people in order to impose rule through a standing
army or select militia was pervasive in Antifederalist rhetoric."133
The Court emphasized that, even after the fear of the national gov-
ernment taking over the universal militia had subsided in the 1850s, the
right to keep arms was still valued for self-defense purposes.' 34 By way
of example, the Court referenced a number of situations where firearms
were taken from recently freed slaves, and used the fact that Union
Army commanders and Congress took action to return the firearms to
their owners, to support the assertion that the right to keep and bear arms
was fundamental.13 5 The majority cited the 39th Congress' reference to
the right to keep and bear arms as a fundamental right deserving of pro-
128. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036 (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968);
Washington v. Glucksberg, 501 U.S. 702 (1997)).
129. Id.
130. Id. (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 3037.
133. Id. (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 598).
134. Id. at 3038.
135. Id. at 3039.
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tection: "Every man . . . should have the right to bear arms for the
defense of himself and family and his homestead . . . "16 Furthermore,
the Court cited the fact that, in 1868, a majority of States' 37 had clauses
in their constitutions that protected the right to keep and bear arms.1
The majority then rejected a number of the respondent's additional
arguments, based largely on the claim that these arguments "are at war
with [its] central holding in Heller."'3 9 The Court first discarded the
assertion that, in the year immediately following the Civil War, Con-
gress "sought to outlaw discriminatory measures taken against freed
men, which it addressed by adopting a non-discrimination principle,"
and, therefore, an outright ban on the possession of guns would have
been considered acceptable, as long as it applied equally to all
citizens. 140
It next dismissed the argument that the Due Process Clause "pro-
tects only those rights recognized by all temperate and civilized govern-
ments,"'4 1 reasoning that this line of argument is "inconsistent with the
long-established standard [the Court] appl[ies] in incorporation
cases."' 4 2 The Court continued, "if our understanding of the right to a
jury trial, the right against self-incrimination, and the right to counsel
were necessary attributes of any civilized country, it would follow that
the United States is the only civilized Nation in the world."' 43 Moreover,
the Court rejected the respondents' suggestion that the aforementioned
argument applies only to substantive rights on grounds that this argu-
ment "flies in the face of more than a half-century of precedent."'"
For two reasons, the Court rejected the respondents' public safety
argument that, because the Second Amendment involves the right to
possess a deadly weapon, it should be treated differently from the other
provisions of the Bill of Rights.' 5 First, the Court reasoned that,
because "all of the constitutional provisions' 46 that impose restrictions
on law enforcement and on the prosecution of crimes fall into the same
category," the Second Amendment should not be treated differently."'
136. Id. (citing 39TH CONG. GLOBE 1182).
137. The Court clarified that the States whose constitutions reflected such a right to keep and
bear arms often lacked formal law enforcement agencies, such as police forces. Id. at 3042 n.27.
138. Id. at 3042.
139. Id. at 3044.
140. Id. at 3042.
141. Id. at 3044.
142. Id. (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 3045 (citing Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947)).
145. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3045.
146. The Court cited the exclusionary rule and the right to a speedy trial as examples of such
constitutional provisions. Id. at 3035.
147. Id. at 3045.
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The Court also rejected this argument because the respondents failed to
cite a case in which the Court "refrained from holding that a provision of
the Bill of Rights is binding on the States on the ground that the right at
issue has disputed public safety implications."'
The respondents' suggestion that state and local governments
should be allowed to enact any gun control law they deem reasonable
was rejected on the ground that the same argument has been rejected in
the past.149 The Court proclaimed, "unless we turn back the clock or
adopt a special incorporation test applicable only to the Second Amend-
ment, . . . respondents' argument must be rejected."15 0
Despite its own recognition of the truth of the argument, the Court
disregarded the respondents' complaint that incorporation of the Second
Amendment right to the States would lead to extensive and costly litiga-
tion."' The Court utilized the exclusionary rule as an example to sup-
port its position that this argument was without merit, since the
respondents' "argument applies with even greater force to constitutional
rights and remedies that have already been held to be binding on the
States." 152
The Court again referred to its decision in Heller in rejecting the
respondents' assertion that firearm rights are generally subject to an
interest-balancing test. 153 "In Heller . .. we expressly rejected the argu-
ment that the scope of the Second Amendment right should be deter-
mined by judicial interest balancing."154 Likewise, the Court used the
fact that, in Heller, it rejected the suggestion that the right to keep and
bear arms was "valued only as a means of preserving the militia."1 55
Rather, the Court "stressed that the right was also valued because the
possession of firearms was thought to be essential to self-defense."156
In summary, as many legal scholars predicted it would be, the
McDonald plurality is based primarily on the Court's two-year old deci-
sion in Heller."s' There, for the first time, the Court held that the Sec-
148. Id.
149. The Court referenced members of the Court who unsuccessfully made the argument in
opposition to the concept of incorporation. Id. at 3046.
150. Id. at 3046.
151. Id. at 3047.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008)).
155. Id. at 3047-48.
156. Id.
157. See Josh Blackman, THE FUTURE OF THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE AFTER




ond Amendment was incorporated to the States through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
B. The Dissents
1. STEVENS: REMOVING THE STATES' ABILITY TO REGULATE
FIREARMS COULD LEAD TO A DESTABILIZATION OF LIBERTY
Justice Stevens framed the issue in McDonald as one of substantive
due process. Justice Stevens insisted that, instead of answering the ques-
tion of "whether the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second
Amendment," the McDonald Court should have addressed the question
of "whether a federal enclave's prohibition on the possession of usable
handguns in the home violates the Second Amendment to the Constitu-
tion."158 Therefore, Justice Stevens, the Court was generally required to
consider the term "liberty" in the Fourteenth Amendment.159 He advised
that such consideration may be, though is not required to be, informed
by the content of the Bill of Rights.1 60 He reasoned that the "so-called
incorporation question was squarely, and . .. correctly resolved in the
late 19th century."161
Justice Stevens agreed with the plurality's rejection of the argument
that the Second Amendment is incorporated to the States through the
Privileges or Immunities Clause. He proclaimed that the petitioners'
suggestion that "invigorating the Privileges or Immunities Clause will
reduce judicial discretion . . . [is] implausible, if not exactly back-
wards."l 62 While Justice Stevens admitted that "there are weighty argu-
ments" supporting the stance that the Second Amendment is
incorporated through the Due Process Clause, he claimed that "these
arguments are less compelling than the [p]lurality suggests; they are
much less compelling when applied outside the home; and their validity
does not depend on the Court's holding in Heller. For that holding sheds
no light on the meaning of the Due Process Clause . . . ."163
Justice Stevens claimed that there were legitimate reasons to hold
state governments to different standards than the federal government and
that failing to do so could have substantial costs. 164 In recognizing that
the Court has made some of the Bill of Rights fully applicable to the
States, he reiterated the fact that "we have never accepted a 'total incor-
158. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3088 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 3092-93.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 3088.
162. Id. at 3089.
163. Id. at 3090.
164. Id. at 3094-95.
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poration' theory of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . and we have declined
to apply several provisions to the States in any measure."16 1 Justice Ste-
vens maintained that when state authorities are required to follow a fed-
eral court on "matter[s] not critical to personal liberty or procedural
justice," states could be thwarted from experimenting in areas that could
potentially provide their citizens with economic and social benefits. 166
He explained that such risks are increased when the same legal standard
is applied across multiple jurisdictions with "disparate needs and
customs."' 67
Justice Stevens' next point was that the Court's "rigid historical
test" was improper in the instant case, namely because "our substantive
due process doctrine has never evaluated substantive rights in purely ...
historical terms." 68 Justice Stevens explained that, in the 1960s, when
the Court applied many of the procedural guarantees in the Bill of Rights
to the States, the Court evaluated the guarantees' functional significance
within the States' regimes, as opposed to the guarantees' historical con-
ceptions.' 69 He elucidated that, if the Fourteenth Amendment's guaran-
tee of liberty embraces only those rights so rooted in history, tradition,
and practice as to require special protection, then, besides ratifying
rights that state actors already afforded the most extensive protection,
the Fourteenth Amendment would serve little function. 170
Next, Justice Stevens explained that, in order to answer the ques-
tion whether the right asserted by the petitioner applied to the States
because of the Fourteenth Amendment itself, the Court had to make two
determinations: first, whether "the nature of the right that has been
asserted," and whether that "right is an aspect of Fourteenth Amendment
liberty."17 1
At the core, Justice Stevens provided six reasons for his disagree-
ment with the Court's approach to McDonald and the conclusions it
drew. 172 First, he argued, "firearms have a fundamentally ambivalent
relationship to liberty." He emphasized that, just as handguns have the
potential to help homeowners defend themselves and their property, they
also have the potential to "help thugs and insurrectionists murder inno-
cent victims."' 74 Further, he explained that, because a gun that ends up
165. Id. at 3094.
166. Id. at 3095.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 3098.
169. Id. at 3099.
170. Id. at 3098.
171. Id. at 3103.
172. Id. at 3105.




in the wrong hands has the potential to facilitate death, it could poten-
tially "destabilize" ordered liberty. 7 5 He summarized this point vividly
when he said,
[y]our interest in keeping and bearing a certain firearm may diminish
my interest in being and feeling safe from armed violence. And while
granting you the right to own a handgun may make you safer on any
given day-assuming the handgun's marginal contribution to self-
defense outweighs its marginal contribution to the risk of accident,
suicide, and criminal mischief-it may make you and the community
you live in less safe overall, owing to the increased number of hand-
guns in circulation.176
Next, Stevens argued that a person's right to choose which firearm
he or she will use is "different in kind from the liberty interests we have
recognized under the Due Process Clause.""' Despite his attempt, Jus-
tice Stevens reported an inability to identify a single substantive due
process case even suggesting that "liberty" includes a common-law right
to self-defense or a right to keep and bear arms. Justice Stevens sug-
gested that the right at issue is "in some respects . . . better viewed as a
property right," pointing out that "interests in the possession of chattels
have traditionally been viewed as property interests subject to definition
and regulation by the States."17 1
In direct response to the plurality, Justice Stevens explained that,
while "some of the other Bill of Rights procedural guarantees may
'place restrictions on law enforcement' that have 'controversial public
safety implications,' . . . those implications are generally quite attenu-
ated ... [and] [t]he link between handgun ownership and public safety is
much tighter."17 9
Third, while recognizing that the United States must be the focus of
the Court, Justice Stevens maintained that it was important to consider
the approaches other countries have taken regarding firearm policies and
regulations. 80 He pointed out that the United States is an "international
outlier in the permissiveness of its approach to guns. . . ."18
Justice Stevens contended that, despite the Court's attempt in Hel-
ler to find otherwise, because the Second Amendment was adopted for
the benefit of the States, the Amendment functions to protect the States
175. Id.
176. Id. at 3018.
177. Id. at 3019.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 3110.
181. Id.
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from encroachment by the Federal Government. 182 Subsequently, he
concluded that the Second Amendment "is a federalism provision . . .
directed at preserving the autonomy of the sovereign States, and its logic
therefore resists incorporation by a federal court against the States."'"
Next, Justice Stevens clarified that, just as Americans' history of
firearm possession may, in fact, be "deeply rooted," so is the States'
history of regulating their possession.8 In fact, he pointed out, the
States' interest in regulating firearm possession is a "far older and more
deeply rooted tradition than is a right to carry . . . [a] weapon."'
Finally, Justice Stevens invoked policy reasons to support his argu-
ment that firearm regulation is an area of the law that should "be
allowed to flourish without the Court's meddling.""' One reason was
that cities and states vary greatly in their problems with crime and gun
use and, consequently, a broad rule on firearm regulation was insuffi-
cient.187 Justice Stevens asserted, "the Court ought to pay particular heed
to state and local legislatures"' and let them individually address these
issues because local government is most knowledgeable about local
problems with gun violence.' 8 Further, he argued that, because the Con-
stitution's history, structure, and text are ambiguous, on the issue at bar,
the "best solution is far from clear," and the Court should "limit experi-
mentation in [this] area."' 90 Additionally, he reasoned that incorporation
of the Second Amendment to the states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment would open the floodgates to litigation "that could mire the federal
courts in fine-grained determinations about which state and local regula-
tions comport with the Heller right."'
Relieved that the Court's decisions in Heller and McDonald are, for
now, limited to the home, Justice Stevens concluded that the McDonald
holding overturned hundreds of years of Supreme Court precedent and
was not "built upon respect for the teachings of history . . . [or] a wise
appreciation of the great roles that the doctrines of federalism and sepa-
ration of powers have played in establishing and preserving American
freedoms."l 92
182. Id. at 3111.
183. Id. (citing Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. V. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in judgment)).
184. Id. at 3112.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 3114.
187. Id.
188. Id. (citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932)).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 3115.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 3120.
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2. BREYER: MCDONALD IS A REJECTION OF PREEXISTING
JUDICIAL CONSENSUS
Justice Breyer's core argument was that the Second Amendment's
right to keep and bear arms is not incorporated to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment."'3 Justice Breyer declared,
I can find nothing in the Second Amendment's text, history, or under-
lying rationale that could warrant characterizing it as "fundamental"
insofar as it seeks to protect the keeping and bearing of arms for
private self defense. Nor can I find any justification for interpreting
the Constitution as transferring ultimate regulatory authority over the
private uses of firearms from democratically elected legislatures to
courts or from the States to the Federal Government.194
Justice Breyer reiterated his dissent in Heller. He maintained that
the "Court rejected the pre-existing judicial consensus that the Second
Amendment was primarily concerned with the need to maintain a 'well
regulated Militia,' . . . and based its conclusions almost exclusively upon
its [flawed] reading of history."l 95 Justice Breyer stated that, because
history in this area is ambiguous, the Heller and McDonald Courts erred
in relying solely on history. 196
Next, Justice Breyer provided four reasons to support his conclu-
sion that "incorporation of the right will work a significant disruption in
the constitutional allocation of decision-making authority, thereby inter-
fering with the Constitution's ability to further its objectives."197 First,
he argued that incorporation of the right recognized in Heller would
deprive the States of their ability to enact laws under their police pow-
ers." Like Justice Stevens, Justice Breyer then suggested that state leg-
islatures are better equipped than the Court to find answers to the
perplexing questions that determining the constitutionality of an individ-
ual state's firearm regulations produce. 19 9 He stated, "[legislatures] are
far better suited than judges to uncover facts and to understand their
relevance. And legislators, unlike Article III judges, can be held demo-
cratically responsible for their empirically based and value-laden conclu-
sions."2 00 In a blunt final statement on this point, Justice Breyer declared
that, just because the Court erred in "Heller is no reason to make matters
193. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 3121.
196. Id. at 3122.
197. Id at 3125.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 3126.
200. Id. at 3128.
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worse here." 201' Further, he pointed out that, historically, States and local
communities have differed with regard to their need for firearm regula-
tions and the appropriate levels of these regulations.202 Fourth, Justice
Breyer provided a brief history of Oak Park's reason for instituting its
gun ban, stating, "although incorporation of any right removes decisions
from the democratic process, the incorporation of this right does so with-
out strong offsetting justifications .... "203
Justice Breyer concluded his dissent by providing an outline of the
numerous flaws in the plurality's historical analysis, with the goal of
demonstrating that States have enacted gun regulations similar to Chi-
cago's and Oak Park's throughout the history of the nation.2 " He argued
that the plurality's assertion that the right to keep and bear arms is
deeply rooted for purposes of self-defense was inconclusive for four
reasons. 205
First, the Second Amendment was enacted in order to protect mili-
tia-related rights. 206 Next, historians who evaluated the Court's historical
analysis in Heller concluded that Eighteenth-century language alluding
to the right to keep and bear arms was not intended to refer to a private
right to self-defense. 20 7 Third, despite the Heller Court's claim to the
contrary, scholarly articles indicated that firearms were heavily regu-
lated at the time of the framing of the Constitution. 208 Further, he high-
lighted the fact that even after the adoption of the Constitution, many
States continued their practices of regulating firearms.209
Finally, Justice Breyer argued that the majority erred in failing to
evaluate Twentieth and Twenty-first-century evidence about the Second
Amendment. 2 10 He stated, "it is essential to consider the recent history
of the right to bear arms for private self-defense when considering
whether the right is fundamental." 21'
201. Id.
202. Id. at 3129 (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr et vir, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) for the proposition
that the law has treated gun control as matters of local concern).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 3131.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. (citing Robert H. Churchill, Gun Regulation, the Police Power, and the Right to Keep
Arms in Early America: The Legal Context of the Second Amendment, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. 139
(2007)).
208. Id. at 3132.
209. Id.





1. SCALIA: STEVENS SELECTIVELY APPLIES PRINCIPALS THAT
SUPPORT His DESIRED CONCLUSION
According to Justice Scalia, the reasons Justice Stevens provided
for his conclusion that the right to keep and bear arms is not fundamen-
tal enough to be applied to the states were flawed, "do[ing] nothing to
stop a judge from arriving at any conclusion [Justice Stevens] sets out to
reach."2 12 He argued that Justice Stevens' reasons were unpersuasive,
". . . intrinsically indeterminate, would preclude incorporation of rights
we have already held incorporated, or both."2 13
For example, Justice Scalia criticized Justice Stevens' argument
that firearms have a "fundamentally ambivalent relationship to liberty,"
as they can be used in an injurious manner.2 14 Citing the First Amend-
ment as an example of a right that would be excluded from incorporation
under Justice Stevens' standard, Justice Scalia asserted that there was no
way Stevens could have meant that the Due Process Clause covers only
rights with no potential harm to anyone.2 15
Justice Scalia also addressed Justice Stevens' assertion that even if
there is a "plausible constitutional basis for holding the right to keep and
bear arms is incorporated," the Court should not do so for prudential
reasons. Justice Scalia responded,
The obviousness of the optimal answer is in the eye of the beholder.
The implication of Justice Stevens' call for abstention is that if We
The Court conclude that They The People's answers to a problem are
silly, we are free to "intervene," but if we are too uncertain of the
right answer, or merely think the States may be on to something, we
can loosen the leash.2 16
Finally, Justice Scalia contended that Justice Stevens inappropriately
attempted to employ criteria that "appl[y] only when judges want it to"




214. Id. at 3054.
215. Id. at 3055.
216. Id. at 3057.
217. Id. at 3056.
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2. THOMAS: THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS IS INCORPORATED
TO THE STATES THROUGH THE PRIVILEGES OR
IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
Justice Thomas concurred in part and concurred in the judgment.2 18
While he agreed with the Court's conclusion that the Second Amend-
ment is incorporated to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment,
Justice Thomas was the only Justice who concluded that the right to
keep and bear arms is not incorporated through the Due Process Clause;
rather, he said, because it is a privilege of American citizenship, it is
incorporated through the Privileges or Immunities Clause.2 19 In response
to the Court's holding that the Second Amendment is incorporated
through the Due Process Clause, Justice Thomas stated, "any serious
argument over the scope of the Due Process Clause must acknowledge
that neither its text nor its history suggests that it protects the many
substantive rights this Court's cases now claim it does."220
While acknowledging the important role stare decisis plays in the
legal system, he maintained, "stare decisis is only an 'adjunct' of our
duty as judges to decide by our best lights what the Constitution
means." 221 Justice Thomas preemptively defended his position, saying
that he was by no means promoting a revision of the country's Four-
teenth Amendment case law; instead, he viewed McDonald as an oppor-
tunity for the Court to reinstate "the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment agreed upon by those who ratified it."222
Thomas dedicated a generous portion of his concurrence to provid-
ing a history of what "ordinary citizens" at the time of and immediately
following ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment understood the
Privileges and Immunities Clause to mean.22 3 He summarized "the rati-
fying public understood the Privileges or Immunities Clause to protect
constitutionally enumerated rights, including the right to keep and bear
arms [i]n my view, the right to keep and bear arms was understood to be
a privilege of American citizenship guaranteed by the Privileges or
Immunities Clause."
218. Id. at 3059 (Thomas, J., concurring).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 3062 (Thomas, J., concurring).
221. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)).
222. Id. at 3063.
223. Id. at 3063-76. Thomas undertook this textual analysis operating under the proposition
from Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), that "[i]t cannot be presumed that any
clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect."
220 [Vol. 66:197
SHOOTING BLANKS
V. A SHOT IN THE DARK: WHY THE COURT'S ANALYSIS IN
McDONALD Is WRONG
Second Amendment activists celebrated their victory when the
Court released its opinion in McDonald. At the same time, critics of the
decision were busy expressing their outrage and frustration. One critic
claimed the Court's ruling was nothing more than the result of "five
conservative, activist judges whose arc of justice bends towards those
with guns no matter the circumstance and no matter the community."224
This critic exclaimed, "[The] U.S. Supreme Court unleashed an
unabated free for all by the NRA and other pro-gun extremists over who
can arm how many people in the shortest period of time."225
Arguments opposing the Court's decision to incorporate the Second
Amendment are not without fortitude. Because evidence supports the
conclusions that the Framers did not intend the Second Amendment to
apply to the States; the Second Amendment is dissimilar to the incorpo-
rated provisions of the Bill of Rights; and state and local governments
are in a better position to regulate firearm possession and use, the
Court's decision in McDonald is flawed.
A. The Second Amendment Was Not Intended to Apply to the States
In Palko v. Connecticut, the Court stated that provisions of the Bill
of Rights are incorporated into the Due Process Clause only if they are
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."226 The Court explained,
"[iun order for a right to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, it
must be . . . essential . . . to the very concept of ordered liberty ... ,
meaning that that neither liberty nor justice would exist if the right were
sacrificed." 227
Therefore, the standard for Fourteenth Amendment incorporation
"is and should be an exacting one." 228 Federalism operates under two
crucial presumptions: When conditions vary from one locale to another,
residents and local governments should be able to address them without
interference of the federal government; and, even if conditions in two
states are comparable, each state may experiment to determine what
solutions work best for that particular state. 229 "The Constitution estab-
224. Rep. Bobby L. Rush, Supreme Courts Decision in McDonald v. City of Chicago Usurps
Local Control Over Public Safety, THE HILL'S CONGRESs BLOG (June 29, 2010, 7:45 AM), http://
thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/106089-supreme-court.
225. Id.
226. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
227. Id. at 326.
228. Brief for Respondents City of Chicago & Village of Oak Park at 10, McDonald, 130 S.
Ct. at 3020 (No. 08-1521).
229. Id. at 10-11.
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lishes a federal republic where local differences are to be cherished as
elements of liberty rather than extirpated in order to produce a single,
nationally applicable rule."23 0
These presumptions are of specific applicability and importance to
the Second Amendment, as "it is the only Bill of Rights provision that
confers a substantive right to possess a specific highly dangerous physi-
cal item-an item designed to kill or inflict serious injury on people." 231
The decision whether to incorporate the federal right to bear arms must
consider its uniquely dangerous character.2 32 The fact that there is con-
siderable debate surrounding firearms regulation helps support the asser-
tion that States and local governments should be given the latitude to
impose and monitor regulations on their own.233 As the Court said in
United States v. Morrison, "we can think of no better example of the
police power, which the Founders denied the National Government and
reposed in the states, than the suppression of violent crime and vindica-
tion of its victims." 234 The Courts' incorrect holding that the Second
Amendment is incorporated to the states "interfere[s] significantly with
each states' ability to structure relations exclusively with its own citi-
zens" and "threaten[s] the future fashioning of effective and creative
programs for solving local problems."235
The Heller and McDonald Courts' rejection of Justice Breyer's
proposal that reasonable gun control regulations should be upheld was
erroneous. States recognizing a right to bear firearms explicitly acknowl-
edge the fact that this right is subject to interest-balancing.23 6 The inter-
ests that must be balanced are "the individuals' ability to defend herself
[and] the collective need to protect all others ."237 Under the reasonable-
ness standard, state courts have historically approved a wide range of
firearm regulations. 238 Because "the reasonableness test has been the
230. Nat'l Rifle Ass'n. of Am., Inc. v. City of Chicago, Ill., 567 F.3d 856, 860 (2009) (citing
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (It is one of
the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose,
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country)).
231. Brief for Respondents City of Chicago & Village of Oak Park, supra note 228, at 11.
232. Brief for the States of Illinois, Maryland et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at
18, McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521).
233. Id.
234. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000).
235. Brief for the States of Illinois, Maryland et al., supra note 232, at 18.
236. See Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Rights to Keep and Bear Arms, 11 TEX. REV. L.
& POL. 191, 194-203 (2006); see also Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105
MICH. L. REV. 683, 686 (2007).
237. Winkler, supra note 236, at 715.
238. Brief for Respondents City of Chicago & Village of Oak Park, supra note 228, at 25.
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rule, not the exception, throughout most of our nation's history,"239 there
is "no reason to fear that the democratic processes at work in the States
will not strike the proper balance between the legitimate interests of gun
owners and public safety."240
Contrary to its holding in McDonald, the Supreme Court previously
made clear that a right that was "sufficiently valued to [be] include[d] in
the Bill of Rights is not sufficient to establish that it was implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty and therefore should be applied to the
States." 24 1 Firearm regulations have an interesting relationship to the
concept of liberty. "Because handguns are so well adapted for the com-
mission of crimes and the infliction of injury and death, stringent hand-
gun regulations, including prohibitions, can be reasonably thought to
create the conditions necessary to foster ordered liberty, rather than
detracting from it." 24 2 By reducing violence, injury, and death, firearm
bans may in fact enhance a system of ordered liberty.243 Inversely,
because incorporation substantially limits a state's ability to make deci-
sions about the best solution to its particular problems, it can actually
intrude upon a system of ordered liberty. 24
The McDonald Court relied heavily on its historical analysis in
Heller to reach the conclusion that the Second Amendment was incorpo-
rated to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. In Heller, the Court analyzed framing-era history in an attempt
to determine if the right to keep and bear arms was a right only con-
nected to militia service or if it was an individual right unrelated to mili-
tia service.24 5 The Court concluded that the Second Amendment was an
"individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confronta-
tion.2 46 The Heller Court noted, however, that the right to keep and bear
arms was not codified to protect individuals in the case of confronta-
tion.247 Instead, the right was codified to protect the militia against the
federal government in the event that the federal government would take
away the militia's arms.248
Historically, "when the Court has examined the Framing-era his-
tory as support for incorporating a right in the Due Process Clause, the
239. Brief of the United States Conference of Mayors as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 22, McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3020 (No. 08-1521).
240. Brief for the States of Illinois, Maryland et al., supra note 232, at 22.
241. Brief for Respondents City of Chicago & Village of Oak Park, supra note 228, at 31.
242. Id. at 15.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577 (2008).
246. Id. at 591.
247. Id. at 598.
248. Id.
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right was included in the Bill of Rights because its protection of individ-
ual liberty was valued for its own sake."2 49 The Second Amendment,
however, was not codified because the Framers thought its protection of
individual liberty was essential to a free society.2 50 Nothing in Heller or
anywhere else suggests that the Framers would have included the Sec-
ond Amendment in the Bill of Rights, if not for the militia-related pur-
pose.251 From this, only one conclusion can be made: The Framers did
not intend the Second Amendment to be incorporated to the States.
B. The Second Amendment Is Unlike the Incorporated Provisions of
the Bill of Rights
In Thornhill v. Alabama,25 2 the Court stated that the First Amend-
ment was incorporated to the States because a person's First Amend-
ment rights are "essential to free government." Likewise, in Wolf v.
Colorado,2 53 the Court held that the Fourth Amendment is incorporated
to the States because "[t]he security of ones privacy against arbitrary
intrusion by the police is basic to a free society and implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty." Unlike the other incorporated provisions of the
Bill of Rights, the Second Amendment is the only provision that confers
a substantive right to possess a specific, highly dangerous item designed
to kill or inflict serious injury.2 54 Petitioners argued25 5 that, because the
Due Process Clause incorporated almost all the other enumerated rights,
the Second Amendment should be incorporated as well. However, "there
is no 'me, too' principle applicable to incorporation. To establish that a
particular provision of the Bill of Rights applies to the States, that par-
ticular provision . . . must be so fundamental that it warrants displacing
the ability of local governments to make their own sovereign choices ...
for their own conditions." 2 56 While other incorporated provisions of the
Bill of Rights were motivated primarily by the protection of private
rights, the Second Amendment was created to preserve state sover-
eignty. Thus, the Second Amendment is not a private right, but rather a
federalism provision that should resist incorporation.25 7
In fact, the Second Amendment is closer to the non-enumerated
249. Brief for Respondents City of Chicago & Village of Oak Park, supra note 228, at 33.
250. Id. at 34.
251. Id.
252. 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940).
253. 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
254. Brief for Respondents City of Chicago & Village of Oak Park, supra note 228, at 11.
255. Brief for Petitioners Otis McDonald, Adam Orlov, Colleen Lawson, David Lawson,
Second Amendment Foundation, Inc., and Illinois State Rifle Association at 66, McDonald v. City
of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
256. Brief for Respondents City of Chicago & Village of Oak Park, supra note 228, at 40.
257. Brief for the States of Illinois, Maryland et al., supra note 232, at 8.
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rights (the Fifth Amendment grand jury and Seventh Amendment civil
jury rights) than to the enumerated rights (First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth
Amendments). 258 The enumerated rights were enumerated because they
themselves are core aspects of liberty. 259 Historically, when the Court
evaluated the meaning of each of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, it
had to address hotly contested issues concerning each of those rights.2 60
"But the necessity to a free society of each of the [incorporated] substan-
tive rights . . . is not seriously open to question." 26 1 On the contrary,
firearms, the subject matter of the Second Amendment, is highly contro-
versial because of a firearm's propensity for causing injury or death.26 2
Consequently, the argument that, because other provisions of the Bill of
Rights have been incorporated, the Second Amendment should also be
incorporated, fails because the Second Amendment is unlike any of the
incorporated provisions of the Bill of Rights and is not, in and of itself, a
core aspect of ordered liberty.
C. Different Communities, Different Problems: States and Local
Government, Not the Federal Government, Should
Regulate Firearm Use
In the United States, handguns are used to kill more people than all
other weapons combined.2 6 3 Handguns are designed to injure or kill, and
conditions of their use and abuse vary widely around the country. 264
Therefore, different communities, not the courts, should be allowed to
come up with varying conclusions about the proper approach to address-
ing these community-specific issues.265 "Gun regulation requires highly
complex socioeconomic calculations regarding how to balance within a
particular community the individual's ability to defend herself against
the collective need to protect others-a balance that courts are not insti-
tutionally equipped to make."26 6
Under certain circumstances, stringent firearm regulations can
reduce injury and death and limit violence altogether.2 67
Firearms cause well over 60,000 deaths and injuries in the United
States each year. Those who live in urban areas, police officers,
258. Brief for Respondents City of Chicago & Village of Oak Park, supra note 228, at 40.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 41.
262. Id.
263. See Josh Sugarmann, EVERY HANDGUN is AIMED AT You: THE CASE FOR BANNING GUNS
75 (2001).
264. Brief for Respondents City of Chicago & Village of Oak Park, supra note 228, at 13.
265. Id. at 12-13.
266. Winkler, supra note 236, at 683.
267. Brief for Respondents City of Chicago & Village of Oak Park, supra note 228, at 13.
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women, and children all may be particularly at risk. And gun regula-
tion may save their lives. Some experts calculated, for example, that
Chicago's handgun ban has saved several hundred lives, perhaps
close to 1,000, since it was enacted in 1983. Other experts argue that
stringent gun regulations can help protect police officers operating on
the front lines against violence.268
A recent study found that stop-and-frisk tactics that focused on discover-
ing concealed handguns reduced crime by disrupting open-air drug
sales.2 69 Further, firearm regulations play an important role in increas-
ing police authority to engage in stop-and-frisk tactics. 270 A stop-and-
frisk conducted by a police officer who reasonably suspects an individ-
ual is carrying a firearm banned by law is considered constitutionally
permissible. However, when law does not ban possession of such fire-
arms, the Fourth Amendment does not permit stop-and-frisks, even
when officers have a reason to believe an individual is armed or danger-
ous. 27 1 The latter situation not only limits a police officer's ability to
fight crime, but it also increases the risk that ordinary citizens will be
injured or even killed by these guns.
In general, urban areas face higher levels of firearm crime and
homicides, while rural areas tend to have more problems with gun sui-
cide and accidents.2 72 Because the amount and nature of gun violence
varies greatly among cities, municipalities have historically pursued dis-
parate approaches regarding the necessity of firearm regulations.2 7 3 A
state's interests in protecting its citizens from injury, loss of life, and
damage caused by firearms should not be handcuffed by the federal gov-
ernment's unwarranted intrusion into a field resting exclusively within
the State's police powers.
The "[h]ealth and safety of . . . citizens are . . . matters of local
concern, [and] states traditionally have had great latitude under their
police powers to legislate as to protection of lives."2 74 For example, by
1770, Boston, New York City, and Philadelphia had enacted laws
prohibiting the shooting of guns.2 75 Boston's law directly addressed the
storage of firearms in the home, as did the municipalities in Heller and
268. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3129 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
269. Bruce D. Johnson, Andrew Golub & Eloise Dunlop, The Rise and Decline of Hard Drugs,
Drug Markers, and Violence in Inner-City New York, in THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA (Alfred
Blumstein & Joel Wallman eds., 2d ed. 2006).
270. Brief of the United States Conference of Mayors, supra note 239, at 14.
271. See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 9.6(a) (4th ed. 2004).
272. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3130 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
273. Id. at 3129.
274. Hillsborough Cty., Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 719 (1985).
275. Churchill, supra note 207, at 162.
226 [Vol. 66:197
SHOOTING BLANKS
McDonald.27 6 This law imposed monetary fines upon anyone who "shall
take [any firearm] into [a] Dwelling-House or Stable, Barn, Out-house,
Ware-house, Store, Shop, or other Building, within the Town of Bos-
ton. . ."2" The Supreme Court of Michigan upheld a statute banning
the possession of any machine gun capable of being fired sixteen times
without reloading. 278 The court reasoned that the statute was a reasona-
ble exercise of the State's police power.279 In 1960, the Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals of Texas upheld a ban on the possession of machine guns,
stating the ban was constitutional.2"o Further, in 1990, the Supreme
Court of Nebraska upheld a statute prohibiting possession of a shotgun.
The court reasoned that the prohibition was a reasonable exercise of the
State's police powers, and did not violate Nebraska's Constitution.28'
Judges lack the experience and knowledge necessary to make
important decisions regarding firearm regulations specific for each com-
munity. The Court is bound by stare decisis and, absent the accountabil-
ity to be held responsible for value-laden conclusions, state and local
governments are better suited to retain the long-recognized right to regu-
late firearms as they see fit for their particular communities' needs.282
VI. WHAT IS A STATE TO Do: THE STANDARD OF REVIEW (OR LACK
THEREOF) FOR THE SECOND AMENDMENT
Although there is little question about McDonald's importance in
Second Amendment jurisprudence, in many ways, it merely opened a
Pandora's Box of uncertainty.283 Despite this author's disagreement with
the Court's holding in McDonald, given the Second Amendment's
incorporation and the Heller and McDonald court's failure to articulate
the standard of review, the lower court's are now charged with determin-
ing the appropriate standard on a case-by-case basis.
Justice Breyer "chided" 284 the majority for not determining the
standard of review and insisted "the question matters."2 85 The majority
justified its failure to establish the standard of review for the Second
Amendment: "Since this case represents this Court's first in-depth
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. People v. Brown, 253 Mich. 537, 539 (1931).
279. Id. at 541.
280. Morrison v. State, 339 S.W.2d 529, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 1960).
281. State v. LaChapelle, 451 N.W.2d 689, 691 (Neb. 1990).
282. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3128 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
283. Ben Howell, Come and Take it: The Status of Texas Handgun Legislation After District of
Columbia v. Heller, 61 BAYLOR L. REv. 215 (2009).
284. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 ("Justice Breyer chides us for leaving so many applications of the
right to keep and bear arms in doubt.")
285. Id. at 687 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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examination of the Second Amendment, one should not expect it to clar-
ify the entire field."28 6 True as it may be that Heller was a case of first
impression for the Court, that justification does not explain the Court's
failure to adopt a standard of review in McDonald. In the latter case, the
Court erroneously determined that the Second Amendment applies to the
States, but failed to provide the States with guidance on a standard of
review to evaluate firearm regulations.
A. Nordyke v. King: The Ninth Circuit's Standard of Review for
the Second Amendment
Since McDonald, lower courts have been left to determine the stan-
dard of review in Second Amendment cases. In Nordyke v. King287 the
Ninth Circuit addressed whether the Second Amendment prohibited Ala-
meda County, California from banning gun shows on county prop-
erty.2 88 The Nordyke court applied the substantial burden test and held
that the county's gun show was constitutional in that it did not substan-
tially burden Second Amendment rights.2 89
Writing for the majority, Judge O'Scannlain reasoned that applying
a single standard of review to all gun-control regulations would be
inconsistent with Heller, where the court "suggested a distinction
between remote and severe burdens on the right to keep and bear
arms."290
Echoing Justice Breyer's dissent in Heller,2 9 1 the Nordyke court
concluded that applying strict scrutiny to all gun-control regulations
would force courts to "determine whether each challenged gun-control
regulation is narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental inter-
est." 292 This would not work since courts cannot determine whether a
regulation is narrowly tailored without deciding whether the regulation
286. Id. at 634 (majority opinion).
287. Nordyke v. King, No. 07-15763, 2011 WL 1632063 (9th Cir. May 2, 2011).
288. Id. at *7.
289. Id. at **7-13. "When deciding whether a restriction on gun sales substantially burdens
Second Amendment rights, we should ask whether the restriction leaves law-abiding citizens with
reasonable alternative means for obtaining firearms sufficient for self-defense purposes." The
court stated, "a law does not substantially burden a constitutional right simply because it makes
the right more expensive or more difficult to exercise." Further, simply declining to use
government funds or property to facilitate the exercise of that right is also unlikely to substantially
burden a constitutional right.
290. Id. at *4.
291. "Adoption of a true strict scrutiny standard for evaluating gun regulations would be
impossible . . . because almost every gun-control regulation will seek to advance . . . a primary
concern for every government-a concern for the safety and ... the lives of its citizens." District
of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 687 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987)).
292. Nordyke, 2011 WL 1632063 at *4.
228 [Vol. 66:197
SHOOTING BLANKS
is likely to be effective. 293 Further, the court stated, "Sorting gun-con-
trol regulations based on their likely effectiveness is a task better fit for
the legislature."294
The Nordyke court held the application of a substantial burden test
would be more "judicially manageable" than an approach that broadly
applies strict scrutiny to all gun-control laws, arguing that this test will
not produce as many difficult empirical questions as strict scrutiny.2 9 5
The court relied on the Supreme Court's application of the substantial or
undue burden test in other contexts296 to support its position and empha-
sized "the Supreme Court does not apply strict scrutiny to every law that
regulates the exercise of a fundamental right .... " While the Nordyke
majority's substantial burden test may in fact be more judicially man-
ageable than a reflexive use of strict scrutiny, the application of the sub-
stantial burden test, a form of heightened scrutiny, would be equally
paradoxical and fatal, leaving presumptively lawful regulations to be
struck down as unlawful.
B. Justice Breyer's Interest Balancing, Or, In the Alternative, Judge
Gould's Reasonableness Review Should be Adopted
Because "gun-control regulation is not a context in which a court
should effectively presume either constitutionality . . . or unconstitution-
ality . . . [and] important interests lie on both sides of the constitutional
equation,"298 Justice Breyer's interest-balancing approach should be
implemented as the standard of review in Second Amendment cases.
Justice Breyer stated, "where a law significantly implicates competing
constitutionality protected interests in complex ways, the Court asks
whether the statute burdens a protected interest in a way or to an extent
that is out of proportion to the statute's salutary effects upon other
important governmental interests."2 99 The majority rejected Breyer's
interest-balancing approach, claiming no other enumerated right has
been "subjected to [such] a freestanding 'interest-balancing'
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. at *5.
296. For example, the Nordyke court cited Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) for its
holding that pre-viability abortion regulations are unconstitutional if they impose an "undue
burden" on a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy, and Clark v. Cmty for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) for its holding that content-neutral speech regulations are
unconstitutional if they do not leave open alternative channels for communication. Nordyke, 2011
WL 1632063 at *6.
297. Id.
298. Heller, 554 U.S. at 689 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
299. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citing Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Govn't. PAC, 528 U.S. 377,
402 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring)).
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approach."oo However, contrary to this assertion, the Court has utilized
this approach301 in election-law cases,302 due process cases,303 and
speech cases.304
Justice Breyer further stated that experience and logic has "led the
Court to decide that in one area of constitutional law or another the
interests are likely to prove stronger on one side of a typical constitu-
tional case than on the other."o Further, because articulating the stan-
dard of review for the Second Amendment is a task the Court has never
previously undertaken, the Court should implement the interest-balanc-
ing standard, as it would "give courts the opportunity to weigh the inter-
ests without the built-in bias for or against the regulation that exists from
the beginning of the evaluation in either the rational-basis or strict-scru-
tiny contexts."306
Because the Heller Court explicitly rejected Justice Breyer's inter-
est-balancing approach30 7 lower courts may be reluctant to adopt such a
methodology. In the alternative, lower courts may consider adopting
Judge Gould's reasonableness standard as laid out in his Nordyke
concurrence.
"I would subject to heightened scrutiny only arms regulations fall-
ing within the core purposes of the Second Amendment, that is, regula-
tions aimed at restricting defense of the home, resistance of tyrannous
government, and protection of country; I would subject incidental bur-
dens on the Second Amendment right to reasonableness review."308
Gould analogized the Second Amendment reasonableness standard to
First Amendment time, place and manner speech restrictions. "Reasona-
ble time, place, and manner restrictions are allowed, but restrictions
based on the content of the speech must satisfy strict scrutiny." 309 The
Nordyke majority incorrectly conflated reasonableness review with
rational basis review and assumed that subjecting Second Amendment
300. Id. at 634 (majority opinion).
301. Id. at 689 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
302. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992).
303. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 339-49 (1976).
304. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Ctny., 391 U.S. 563, 568
(1968).
305. Heller, 554 U.S. at 689-91.
306. Ryan L. Card, An Opinion Without Standards: The Supreme Court's Refusal to Adopt A
Standard of Constitutional Review in District of Columbia v. Heller Will Likely Cause Headaches
for Future Judicial Review of Gun-Control Regulations, 23 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L., 259, 287 (2009).
307. "The very enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of government-even the Third
Branch of Government-the power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really
worth insisting upon. A constitutional guarantee subject to future judges' assessments of its
usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at all." Heller, 554 U.S. at 684.




regulations to reasonableness review would essentially be applying
rational basis scrutiny to every gun-control regulation that is not a total
ban on handguns. 310 Gould differentiated the reasonableness test as
focusing on the balance of the interests at stake, 3 1' as opposed to rational
basis under which a court evaluates whether any public welfare rationale
exists for the restriction.3 12 Unlike rational basis review, which would
"approve laws that make guns nearly impossible to obtain," depending
on the interests at stake, under reasonableness review some arms restric-
tions will be invalidated.3" Because "prudent, measured armed restric-
tions for public safety are not inconsistent with a strong and thriving
Second Amendment," 3 14 incidental burdens on the Second Amendment
should be subject to reasonableness review.
VII. CONCLUSION
McDonald is undisputedly a landmark case. A pernicious combina-
tion of the Court's self-serving reading of history, its over-reliance on
Heller, and the majority's crude love affair with the gun has led to the
erroneous conclusion that the Second Amendment is incorporated to the
States through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
Because gun use varies widely among communities, local govern-
ments should retain their historic privilege of regulating firearm control.
Further, unlike the neutral arbiters of the law, state and local representa-
tives have direct access to empirical data relating to community-specific
issues and have experience with these matters. Contrary to the Courts
previous holding that the safety and well-being of a state's citizens falls
within a states police powers, the McDonald Court has upset the princi-
ples of federalism on which this country was founded.
As demonstrated in the Ninth Circuit's lengthy discussion in
Nordyke, in failing to articulate the standard of review for the Second
Amendment the Supreme Court has left the lower courts shooting blanks
in a live-ammunition gunfight.
310. Id. at *16.
311. Given Gould's explanation of reasonableness review as "focusing on the balance of
interest at stake," reasonableness review can be considered analogous to Justice Breyer's interest-
balancing approach. However, because the Court has not explicitly rejected reasonableness
review, lower courts may feel more inclined to adopt this standard.
312. Nordyke, 2011 WL 1632063 at *16.
313. Id. at *17.
314. Id. at *18.
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